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It makes sense to punish criminals and it makes sense to protect
freedom of speech. These principles are axiomatic in America, even if
each is supported by a variety of sometimes conflicting rationales. In
certain instances, though, speech itself may be criminal, as in cases of
fraud or conspiracy, and we do not worry much about burdening
speech by punishing such acts. Recently, however, it has become
common for courts to impose great restrictions on speech by criminals
when such speech is not itself criminal, but is merely related to their
illegal acts, such as publication of memoirs or appearance on talk
shows. Restrictions typically forbid receipt of payment for expression
deemed to be crime-related, or require forfeiture of any resulting
income.
Efforts to restrict crime-related expression by statute have been
quieted, though by no means barred, by the Supreme Court's rejection
of New York's "Son of Sam" law in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New
York State Crime Victims Board.1 As described below, however, in
striking down New York's statute the Court found that states have "an
undisputed compelling interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit
from their crimes," 2 as well as a compelling interest in compensating
victims.3 While expressly declining to address the question of
"whether book royalties can properly be termed the profits of crime,"4
the Court in effect invited states and lower courts to find new, more
narrowly-tailored means to serve those supposed compelling interests.
Lower courts have attempted to do so with fines and individual
probation conditions.
5
In Part I, this article reviews Simon & Schuster and argues that
"profit from crime" cannot reasonably be defined to include
expression-related income of the sort at issue here and that the
"compelling interest" of prohibiting criminal profit cannot, therefore,
justify significant content-based burdens on expression. Part II reviews
a series of cases in which courts have expressed open hostility toward
popular media while restricting criminal speech, and argues that,
whatever the ostensible interests of the states may be, courts have
significantly overreached, creating a subset of disfavored speech which
1. 502 U.S. 105 (1991); see discussion infra Part I.
2. 502 U.S. at 119.
3. Id. at 118.
4. Id. at 119.
5. See infra Part III.
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is not otherwise recognized in First Amendment jurisprudence. Part
III examines the case of former radical activist Katherine Anne Power
to illustrate the power of the chilling effect on crime-related
expression and the gravity of its consequences in a case of great social
significance. The paper concludes with a discussion of why, in the
context of criminal punishment, further deprivation of rights matters,
and how the reasoning of the courts in these cases weaken First
Amendment values.
I
Son of Sam and Simon & Schuster
In 1991 the Supreme Court struck down New York's "Son of
Sam" law, which required any entity contracting with an accused or
convicted person for a depiction of their crime to submit the contract
to the Crime Victims Board for review and to turn over to the Board
any income owed under the contract.6 The funds would then be placed
in escrow to compensate victims who recovered money damages in
civil actions.7 The law had been hastily passed in an effort to prevent
"Son of Sam" killer David Berkowitz from profiting from media
interest in his crimes.8 The Court found the statute to be
unconstitutionally overinclusive, noting that the law reached
individuals who were never formally accused or convicted of their
crimes as well as works that only tangentially expressed thoughts and
recollections of the crimes.9 The statute was also underinclusive,
although the Court did not so hold, 10 because it reached only the
criminal's profits from expression and not other activities and because
it would return profits to the criminal author after five years if not
claimed by civil judgments. 1
1
6. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 105.
7. Id. at 109-110; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-632-a. (McKinney 1982).
8. In re Johnsen, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979):
[Tihe Legislature, shocked by the large numbers of vicarious thrill seekers
and by the media trumpeting forth each little Berkowitz happening, hastened to
debar Berkowitz and others from profiting from their heinous misdeeds.
Section 632-a of the Executive Law, conceived in haste, written in haste, and
declared under the cry of the public for the Legislature to exact retribution,
reflects its noble spirit, though clothed in loose, vague, and inconsistent language.
9. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121.
10. Id. at 123-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[T]he New York statute is
underinclusive as well as overinclusive and.., we should say so.").
11. See Kathleen M. Timmons, Note, Natural Born Writers: The Law's Continued
Annoyance with Criminal Authors, 29 GA. L. REV. 1121, 1135-36 (1995).
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The Court began its discussion of the financial disincentives the
law imposed on criminal authors by declaring, "[a] statute is
presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a
financial burden on speakers because of the content of their
speech,' 12 and concluded:
New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a
financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other
income. The State's interest in compensating victims from the fruits
of crime is a compelling one, but tje Son of Sam law is not narrowly
tailored to advance that objective.
Despite the apparent firmness of its statement that content-based
financial burdens on speech are inconsistent with the First
Amendment, the Court in fact opened the door to such schemes by
asserting that states have "an undisputed compelling interest in
ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes" 14 and "a
compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime are compensated
by those who harm them." 15 Recognizing the opening, legislatures
16
and courts17 have used these justifications to devise various means of
depriving criminals of any earnings from their stories, even when these
efforts undermine the goal of compensating victims.
The Supreme Court, however, expressly declined to address the
question of "whether book royalties can properly be termed the
profits of crime,"'18 thus leaving in doubt the validity of the compelling
interest underlying most Son of Sam-type cases. The circumstances in
which speech itself may be criminal are very few, and the
circumstances in which money or goods may be deemed sufficiently
related to criminal acts to allow forfeiture are equally few. Crime-
related expression is clearly not criminal in the sense that speech
comprising incitement 19 or fraud may be. Nor is the income from such
12. 502 U.S. at 115 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 123.
14. Id. at 119.
15. Id. at 118.
16. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 764 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West
1994) ("Son of Sam" laws).
17. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Power, 420 Mass. 410, 650 N.E. 87 (1995) (affirming
condition of probation prohibiting defendant, her representatives and assignees from
profiting from sale of her story); United States v. Scale, 20 F.3d 1279 (3d Cir. 1994)
(allowing imposition of fines on defendants with claimed negative net worth in anticipation
of possible sale of rights to story).
18. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 119.
19. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (speech may be penalized as
incitement to lawless action only if it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
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expression clearly forfeitable profit from crime. To say that expression
(or compensation from expression) is forfeitable is to say that the
thoughts (or feelings or experiences) of the criminal are themselves
the fruits of crime in the manner of contraband, or "objects gained
from or used to further criminal activity." 20 This perspective
unrealistically reduces memory or perception to something which may
be literally linked to specific events and which may be neatly
segregated and quarantined from other memories and perceptions.
Yet that is how legislatures and courts have treated the ideas that
comprise the content of criminal expression-as if they were
isolatable contraband or ill-gotten gains.
If crime-related expression is neither criminal nor convincingly
analogized to contraband, however, the burdens imposed upon it
might be more usefully analogized to penalty enhancement statutes
which increase the punishment for crimes motivated by hate. Under
such laws, otherwise identical assaults may be punished differently
depending upon what the assailant said prior to or during the crime. A
penalty enhancement statute of this sort was upheld by a unanimous
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,22 on the ground that it was
aimed at conduct and so did not violate the First Amendment. 23 The
Court noted that racial motivation is also penalized in civil rights
legislation, and argued that Wisconsin could find that bias-motivated
crimes caused greater individual and social harm which "over and
above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases" 24 justified
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
20. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF SENTENCING 53 (1991) (footnotes
omitted) "Criminal forfeiture proceedings transfer ownership of specified property from
offenders to the state; as such they are strictly scrutinized by appellate tribunals. Items
subject to forfeiture generally fall into two categories: objects illegal as contraband, and
objects gained from or used to further criminal activity." Traditional forfeiture statutes
that rely on these two categories have been consistently found to be constitutionally valid.
Id.
21. For an extreme position equating expression related to an act with the act itself,
see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 33 (1993):
To express eroticism is to engage in eroticism, meaning to perform a sex act. To
say it is to do it, and to do it is to say it. It is also to do the harm of it and
exacerbate harms surrounding it. In this context, unrecognized by law, it is to
practice sex inequality as well as to express it.
22. 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993).
23. The Court distinguished R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking
down ordinance penalizing bias-related crime as overbroad and impermissibly content-
based), stating that unlike the Wisconsin statute the St. Paul ordinance was "explicitly
directed at expression." Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487.





Assuming that it is true that some motivations, as proven by
contemporaneous expression,26 merit more severe sanctions than
others (given, of course, that a finding of motivation of some sort is
generally necessary to distinguish criminal from non-criminal
action 27 ), it does not necessarily follow that post-arrest expression also
relates to the original criminal intent in such a way that it makes the
criminal more culpable and more deserving of punishment. No one
has argued seriously that people commit crimes in order to be on
television or to increase the advances they might command for their
books. Motivation aside, though, it may be true that victims and some
members of the general public are so offended by crime-related
expression in the media that the additional harm they suffer could be
described as a "secondary effect" of the crime, thereby justifying
regulation.28 But in R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul,29 the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that listeners' reactions to speech could constitute
the sort of secondary effect that would justify speech regulation.30 The
usual purpose of speech is to have communicative impact. To control
speech on the basis of that impact, or because of the content of the
speech, is to thwart the purpose of the First Amendment. In short,
then, the "compelling interest" that criminals not be allowed to profit
from their stories appears to be based on a purely retributive
rationale, not grounded in any convincing analysis of the relationship
between the expression and the crime to which it relates.
31
25. Id.
26. Id. at 488: "The First Amendment ... does not prohibit evidentiary use of speech
to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent."
27. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 95-106 (1987)
(defining mens rea and distinguishing degrees of culpability and intention).
28. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding
ordinance regulating businesses dealing in sexually explicit materials as a content-neutral
attempt to. address "secondary effects" such businesses have on local crime rates and
property values).
29. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
30. Id. at 394 ("The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary
effect."').
31. The retributive rationale cannot justify the risk of infringement of fundamental
constitutional rights absent a clear demonstration of the relationship of the punishment to
the crime-a showing which the retributive rationale itself tends to obscure. See
CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 36 (footnotes omitted):
Perhaps the most serious flaw of the retribution rationale is the barrier it erects
against a rational approach to crime and sentencing. The symbolic and
psychological potency of this rationale, its invocation in the name of protecting
cherished cultural values, and its mass appeal all serve to sweep aside scientific
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The contours of the argument for protection of speech related to
criminal experience are clear: free speech is an affirmative value, not
merely grudgingly allowed by the Constitution but actively
encouraged; 32 the First Amendment has been interpreted to imply a
right of the public to receive information as well as a right of the
media or individuals to speak;33 expression describing or touching on
criminal experience does not (necessarily) fall within any of the few
categories of speech traditionally disfavored in First Amendment
jurisprudence; content-based financial disincentives to speech have a
"chilling effect" on free expression as impermissible as any direct
restraint.35 According to scholar Frederick Schauer, "[a] chilling effect
occurs when individuals seeking to engage in activity protected by the
First Amendment are deterred from doing so by governmental
regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity."
36
inquiry into the true nature of crime and the law of sentencing.
32. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (freedom of speech is a
"preferred right"); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unravelling the
"Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REV. 685, 691 (1978) ("Free speech is an affirmative value-
we are concerned with encouraging speech almost as much as with preventing its
restriction by the government.") (footnotes omitted); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 197-200 (1977).
33. See Richard Labunski, A First Amendment Exception to the "Collateral Bar" Rule:
Protecting Freedom of Expression and the Legitimacy of Courts, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 405, 415
(1995) (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)). See also Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 566-67
(1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting): "The admitted design and the overt purpose of the
forfeiture in this [RICO] case are to destroy an entire speech business and all its protected
titles, thus depriving the public of access to lawful expression. This is restraint in more than
theory. It is censorship all too real."
34. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring):
Here a law is directed to speech alone where the speech is not obscene, not
defamatory, not words tantamount to an act otherwise criminal, not an
impairment of some other constitutional right, not an incitement to lawless action,
and not calculated or likely to bring about imminent harm the State has the
substantive power to prevent.
35. Id. at 115 ("A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it
imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.") (citing
Leathers v. Madlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991)); see also United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 469 (1995): "Publishers compensate authors because
compensation provides a significant incentive toward more expression. By denying
respondents that incentive, the honoraria ban [imposed on low-level Executive Branch
employees by the Ethics in Government Act] induces them to curtail their expression if
they wish to continue working for the government." (footnotes omitted).
36. Schauer, supra note 32, at 693. For purposes of this discussion, Schauer's
definition might be usefully amended to state, "are deterred from doing so by
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Despite the clear precedents for protecting crime-related expression,
First Amendment protections for criminal speakers and their
publishers have been undermined by the unexamined invocation of
"compelling interests" in denying criminals profit and compensating
victims, and, as discussed below, by the rhetorical positioning of
popular media and crime-related expression as disfavored speech.
II
Oprah as an Aggravating Circumstance
The forms and application of punishment reflect social and
political values as much or more than they do utilitarian efforts to
control crime. Not only do political considerations often overwhelm
criminological ones, 37 but judges and other "penal practitioners" are
actively engaged in symbolic conduct that shapes social mores. In the
words of criminologist David Garland, the penal establishment
"routinely interprets events, defines conduct, classifies action, and
evaluates worth, and having done so, it sanctions these judgments with
the authority of law, forcefully projecting them on to offenders and
the public audience alike." 38 While it is perfectly appropriate, and
perhaps inevitable, that punishment operates as a social text which
conveys meaning, it is important to recognize that the values so
conveyed may not comport with legal norms, and that judges
enforcing them may exceed their constitutional authority.
The words of judges and politicians addressing crime-related
expression suggest that attitudes toward media and criminal speech
unduly influence the choice and application of legal standards. For
example, although existing laws already prohibited falsifying evidence
and bribing, threatening, intimidating, or otherwise influencing
witnesses, 39 concern about jury taint and witness motivation swelled in
California along with the intensive media coverage of the O.J.
Simpson trial.4° When California passed its legally troubled
governmental regulation not openly directed at that protected activity."
37. See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN
SOCIAL THEORY 20 (1990) ("It is not crime or even criminological knowledge about crime
which most affects policy decisions, but rather the ways in which 'the crime problem' is
officially perceived and the political positions to which these perceptions give rise.").
38. Id. at 252.
39. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 132-140 (West 1994). See also Ivy Cubell, Note, Banning
the Sale of Witness Testimony: A First Amendment Challenge to California Penal Code
Section 132.5, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1135, 1139 n.25 (1995).
40. See Cubell, supra note 39, at 1139.
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"checkbook journalism" law41 allowing criminal prosecution of
witnesses, potential witnesses, and jurors who entered agreements or
accepted payment for information about trials, 42 Governor Pete
Wilson was quick to denounce the media, stating that the law would
4"ensure that witnesses and jurors are a force for justice, not fodder for
tabloids, and that attorneys will represent their client[s], not lead a
media circus."43 He also fretted that the legal system served as a
"clearinghouse for hearsay, idle gossip and rumor-mongering about
the lifestyles of the rich and famous."
44
But if one expects heated rhetoric from politicians, one expects
more reasoned, consideration from judges, who are charged with
impartial application of the law. Cases involving crime-related
expression have not borne out that expectation, however. In United
States v. Seale,45 for example, the Third Circuit described the public's
interest in "stories involving bizarre criminal acts" as "almost
obsessive."46  "The consumers' appetite for such accounts seems
commensurate with the lurid nature of the details of the criminal acts
described. ' 47 This gratuitous characterization is found in an opinion
vacating the fines imposed on a couple convicted of a notorious
kidnap-murder (the fi nes were seven times the maximum permitted by
the United States Sentencing Guidelines for one defendant, and two
41. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 116.5, 132.5 (West Supp. 1995). See also James R. Cady,
Bouncing "Checkbook Journalism": A Balance Between the First and Fifth Amendments in
High Profile Criminal Cases, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 671, 676 (1995):
California Penal Code Section 116.5 which is aimed at jurors, was successfully
enjoined from specific application against plaintiffs Michael Knox, one of the
original twelve jurors empaneled but later excused from the O.J. Simpson murder
trial in Los Angeles, and Dove Audio, Inc., a California corporation which sought
to enter into an agreement with Knox to publish a book concerning his
experiences and impressions as a juror in the Simpson case. Three months later,
section 132.5 of the California Penal Code and section 1669.7 of the California
Civil Code, both of which targeted witnesses [and potential witnesses] who sell
information, were permanently enjoined from enforcement following a challenge
by the California First Amendment Coalition.
(footnotes omitted).
42. Cady, supra note 41, at 676.
43. Carl Ingram, Legislation Inspired by Simpson Case Signed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1994, at A21.
44. Id. Cf Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 111 (noting that New York's Son of Sam law
had been selectively enforced against defendants whose crimes had received extensive
media coverage).
45. 20 F.3d 1279 (3d Cir. 1994).
46. Id. at 1283.
47. Id.
1997]
times the maximum for the other48) but holding in principle, the right
of the court to fine indigent defendants in anticipation of the sale of
their media rights.49 The court distinguished the facts of the case from
those of Simon & Schuster by stating, "although there may be an
indirect burden placed upon the Seales' speech, as a sufficiently large
fine may deprive them of the financial incentive to speak, this burden
is established within the context of the criminal penalty, and the fine is
not otherwise selective."
50
That is, although the stated rationale of the district court was to
prohibit profit from expressive activity related to the crimes,51 and
although the Third Circuit shared the open hostility of the trial judge
to that expression, the burden imposed on expression here was not, in
theory, content-specific: the fines could presumably be satisfied by
earnings from the prison laundry. Despite it's overall approval of the
district court's reasoning, however, the court of appeals was forced to
recognize that the fines could have the unintended effect of ensuring
sale of the story: "Consideration of Mrs. Seale's ability to sell her story
as her sole possible future source of income could create the
anomalous result of encouraging her to do so (which is clearly what the
district court sought to prevent) in order to pay her fine."
52
In In re Johnsen,53 a lower court's support for New York's Son of
Sam law was similarly loaded with inappropriate characterizations of
popular media and audiences:
The sophistication of our society has embellished the field of
entertainment to the extent that reading of the "exploits" becomes
an acceptable substitute for "live performances in the Roman
arena[;]" witness the mad rush of publishers to obtain the literary
and motion picture rights to the last days of the condemned
murderer who preferred death by execution to life imprisonment.
And in a pre-Simon & Schuster case, United States v. Waxman,
55
the normal, legal, business activity of the popular press was treated
48. Id. at 1282.
49. Id. at 1284.
50. Id. at 1285 n.7.
51. "[I]t's the Court's intent that neither defendant profit from their [sic] brutal crime.
They didn't obtain eighteen and a half million dollars [in ransom] from Exxon, and it's my
intent that they not obtain or direct the payment of any money from exploiting their foiled
crimes." Id. at 1287-88 (quoting the trial record).
52. Id. at 1285 (emphasis added).
53. 430 N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
54. Id. at 906; see also supra note 8.
55. 638 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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with sarcasm and disdain when a convicted art thief challenged the
constitutionality of a condition of probation which prohibited him
from receiving payment for the sale of his story: "I remain convinced
that the sensational crime should not be glamorized by the inevitable
book, the barnstorming trip from city to city, the press conferences
and autograph sessions, the appearances on TV, the trumpet blastannouncing the aperback edition, and finally, with any luck at all, a
motion picture."
'56
The judge's statement was at odds with his prior assertion that the
purpose of the condition was to prevent the defendant from profiting
from his crime.57 While that may be a proper judicial function,
preventing "glamorization" of a crime in the form of media exposure
is not, and the judge's own words clearly reflect a hope that the
financial disincentive will chill expression.
Perhaps most troubling of all, a federal district court in New
Jersey described a defendant's appearance on the Oprah Winfrey
Show as an "aggravating circumstance" that justified an upward
departure from sentencing guidelines. 58 The defendant was a private
investigator who had been convicted of conspiring to bribe
bureaucrats in order to gain access to information in the files of the
Social Security Agency.59 While awaiting sentencing, the defendant
"appeared on the Oprah Winfrey Show and detailed the workings of
his private investigation business and others like it," and reported that
"present and former government employees capitalize on pervasive
abuse of confidential information. '' 6U The trial judge granted the
government's motion for an upward departure.
61
The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing,
arguing somewhat blandly that "it seems inappropriate to us if the
severity of [the defendant's] punishment was increased because he
sought to call attention to a situation that is unquestionably a matter
of public concern." 62 The court hedged, however, stating that not all
aspects of the defendant's appearances were "necessarily irrelevant to
56. Id. at 1247.
57. Id. at 1246 ("The intention of this condition is to preclude the defendant from
obtaining any profit or financial benefit or in any way capitalizing upon his art theft or
subsequent treatment and this provision shall be construed broadly.").
58. United States v. Schweitzer, 5 F.3d 44, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1993).
59. Id. at 45.
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 48.
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a decision on departure." 63 Thus, the public skepticism of the
defendant toward the integrity of government bureaucrats, which
seemed to trouble the prosecutors and the trial judge, 64 was not
excluded as a consideration in sentencing.
The attitudes toward media expressed by the judges in these cases
exceed the requirements of the adjudication of the matters before the
courts, and, to the extent that they form the basis for additional
punishment and burden speech rights "of defendants, they represent
judicial overreaching. David Garland argues that judges are acutely
aware of the supralegal symbolic function of their pronouncements,
which "provide a continuous, repetitive set of instructions as to how
we should think about good and evil, normal and pathological,
legitimate and illegitimate, order and disorder." 65 A problem arises,
though, when the pronouncements are not about matters within the
scope of judicial authority, such as the presence or absence of
mitigating factors, but are about things which-to put it flatly-are no
part of the judges' business, such as what constitutes a respectable
speech venue or what are the appropriate objects of media and public
fascination. When, in addition, these opinions become the apparent
basis for burdening fundamental rights, then those rights have been
wrongly infringed.
III
The Chilling Effect and the Radical Who Came in from the Cold
One recent case, above all, illustrates the potential harm of
burdening crime-related expression. The case is noteworthy, in part,
because in it the court ignored the victim compensation rationale
entirely and relied solely on the retributive anti-criminal .profit
rationale legitimized by Simon & Schuster. It is also noteworthy
because the facts of the case highlight both the tenuous relationship
between crime-related expression and the criminal acts being
punished, and the burden borne by the public when crime-related
expression is restricted.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 46 ("This loss of public confidence ... was enhanced by the Oprah Winfrey
Show on which he rather arrogantly appeared, telling people who had not theretofore
known that their information, too, may have been compromised [by the corruption of
bureaucrats].").
65. GARLAND, supra note 37, at 252.
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In Commonwealth v. Power,66 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed a condition of probation that prohibited
defendant Katherine Ann Power, and her representatives and
assignees, from profiting from the sale of her story.67 In doing so the
court avoided the broad anti-media statements which characterized
the cases discussed in Part II of this article, and presented a more
subtly reasoned approach to a ban on sale of crime-related expression.
Twenty-three years after participating in a politically-motivated
bank robbery in which a policeman was killed, Power voluntarily
surrendered to authorities "in the glare of national news media
attention" 68 and ,lead guilty to two counts of armed robbery and one
of manslaughter. 69 She was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of
eight to twelve years for manslaughter and one armed robbery charge,
and twenty years of probation for the second armed robbery charge,
which was punishable by life imprisonment. 70
Power appealed the broadly-worded condition barring the sale of
her story, which she had signed in open court,71 claiming that it was a
content-based prior restraint on her speech.72 The court responded
that the condition "merely prohibits the defendant from profiting
financially from speech about her crime or her experience as a
fugitive. ' 73 The court distinguished Simon & Schuster by noting that it
66. 650 N.E.2d 87 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1995).
67. Id. at 89. The condition imposed by the trial court read:
You, your assignees and your representatives acting on your authority are
prohibited from directly or indirectly engaging in any profit or benefit generating
activity relating to the publication of facts or circumstances pertaining to your
involvement in the criminal acts for which you stand convicted (including
contracting with any person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other
legal entity with respect to the commission and/or reenactment of your crimes, by
way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio
or television presentations, live entertainment of any kind, or from the expression
of your thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime). This
prohibition includes those events undertaken and experienced by you while
avoiding apprehension from the authorities. Any action taken by you whether by
way of execution of power of attorney, creation of corporate entities or like
action to avoid compliance with this condition or probation will be considered a
violation of probation conditions.
68. Id. at 88.
69. Id. at 88-89.
70. Id. at 89.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 90.
73. Id.
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"involved a statute of general applicability" 74 while the special
condition "applies only to the defendant and is reasonably related to a
valid probation purpose,"75 that is, deterring the defendant and others
"from seeking to profit directly or indirectly from criminality." 76 In
fact, Massachusetts has a Son of Sam law similar to that struck down
in Simon & Schuster, and the probation condition was apparently
fashioned to survive a constitutional challenge while achieving the
same effect.
77
Power also claimed that the probation condition put her in
jeopardy for the acts of third parties, and burdened persons not
convicted of any crime. The court responded that "[t]he condition
does not restrict any third party from telling the defendant's story,
provided he or she is not acting on the defendant's authority as her
representative or as her assignee." 78 Finally, the court rejected
Power's claim that the condition was unconstitutionally vague and
"improperly leaves decisions to probation officers about when she can
and cannot speak,"7 9 stating, "'if the language which is challenged
conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practices, it is
constitutionally adequate.' 80 The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 81
Power's argument that the wording of the special condition was
unconstitutionally vague and put her at risk for the acts of third
parties is not without merit. If the court had taken the time to analyze
its language, rather than falling back on its apparently clear thrust, it
might have noted that "indirectly engaging... [in] benefit generating
activity relating to the publication of facts... pertaining to"
involvement in her crime, including expression of her "thoughts,
feelings, opinions or emotions" is indeed vague enough to put
decisions about when she can or cannot speak in the hands of
probation officers.82 The condition does not state that she cannot sell
74. Id. at 90-91.
75. Id. at 91.
76. Id.
77. See Sara Rimer, Ex-Fugitive in 1970 Slaying GetsPrison Term and Scorn, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1993, at Al, B15.
78. Power, 650 N.E.2d at 93.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Adams, 450 N.E.2d 149, 152-53 (1983) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 269 N.E.2d 491, 496-97 (1971))).
81. 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).
82. See supra notes 67 and 80 and accompanying text.
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the rights to her story but rather allows authorities to determine
whether or not her expression constitutes a "profit or benefit
generating activity." More importantly, the condition does not state
that the prohibited profit or benefit must be hers. As worded, the
condition could bar Power from cooperating-by talking, without
pay-with reporters or television producers whose activity would lead
to profit or benefit for themselves or their employers.
Still, the Supreme Judicial Court may have been correct that the
condition conveyed "sufficiently definite warnings," though not in the
way the court meant. When imposing the condition, trial judge Robert
Banks announced, "I will not permit profit from the lifeblood of a
Boston police officer by someone responsible for the killing."83 In a
sense, Power was challenging the very clarity of Judge Banks' message
as much as the broad language of the condition. The Massachusetts
high court's claim that the condition allows Power "to speak on any
subject, including her crimes" 84 as long as she does not profit, ignored
the substantial, intended chilling effect of harshly expressed and
broadly worded State disapproval in a probationary context.
Just three months before the Power decision, the chilling effect
doctrine had been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court (although not by
name) in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union.
85
There, citing Simon & Schuster, the Court held that section 501(b) of
the Ethics in Government .Act,86 which prohibited certain federal
employees from accepting honoraria for speaking or writing articles,
violated the First Amendment:
87
Although section 501(b) neither prohibits any speech nor
discriminates among speakers based on the content or viewpoint of
their messages, its prohibition on compensation unquestionably
imposes a significant burden on expressive activity.... Publishers
compensate authors because compensation provides significant
incentive toward more expression. By denying respondents that
incentive, the honoraria ban induces them to curtail their expression
if they wish to continue working for the Government.
How much greater the inducement to curtail expression, though,
when the speaker is faced not with loss of a job but with violation of
probation for a crime punishable by life imprisonment.
83. Rimer, supra note 77, at Al.
84. Power, 650 N.E.2d at 90.
85. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
86. 5 U.S.C. App. 4 § 501(b) (1995).
87. National Treasury, 513 U.S. at 454.
88. Id. at 455 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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The Power court, which did not cite National Treasury,
acknowledged that the special probation condition implicated Power's
First Amendment rights, 89 but took advantage of Simon & Schuster's
holdings that a content-based financial burden on speech may be
justified if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling State interest, and
that preventing profit from criminals speaking about their crimes was
such a compelling interest. 90 The court then reasoned that the
individually applied special condition was subject only to a
"reasonably related" test, unlike the "strict scrutiny" applied against a
statute of general applicability.
91
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Power court
was correct in relaxing the Simon & Schuster standard-which was
itself persuasively criticized by Justice Kennedy as a misreading of
precedent which would result in insufficient protection of speech
rights92-the case of Katherine Ann Power would still cast doubt on
the social value of burdening speech.
During the 1960s, Power evolved from a Catholic schoolgirl
whose recipes won her a homemaking award to a talented and well-
liked student at Brandeis University who became involved in anti-war
politics, and finally to a radical activist sought for more than twenty
years for her role in the theft of 400 pounds of explosives from a
National Guard armory and the $26,000 bank robbery in which police
officer Walter Schroeder was murdered. 93 When she voluntarily
surrendered to face the long-standing charges against her, she was
both remorseful and articulate about the historical context of her
crimes:
I am surrendering to authorities today to answer charges that arise
from a series of acts 23 years ago. I am here to plead guilty to these
89. Power, 650 N.E.2d at 90.
90. Id. at 90 n.3 and accompanying text.
91. Id. at 91.
92. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring):
Borrowing the compelling interest and narrow tailoring analysis [from due
process cases] is ill-advised when all that is at issue is a content-based restriction,
for resort to the test might be read as a concession that States may censor speech
whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for doing so. Our
precedents and traditions allow no such inference.
See also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 212 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(reaffirming his argument that the Court's adoption of the compelling interest test for
content-based restrictions on expression "was accomplished by accident" and is in error).
93. Sara Rimer, A Conscience Haunted by a Radical's Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1993, at Al; Barbara Kantrowitz et al., The Fugitive: Notes from the Underground,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27,1993, at 54.
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charges, and I am prepared to accept whatever consequences the
legal system will impose....
The illegal acts that I committed arose not from any desire for
personal gain, 'but from a deep philosophical and spiritual
commitment that if a wrong exists, one must take active steps to stop
it, regardless of the consequences to oneself in comfort or security.
Although at the time those actions seemed the correct course, they
were in fact naive and unthinking.
My intention was never to damage any human life by my acts, and
there is no accusation that I was directly responsible for the death of
Walter Schroeder. His death was shocking to me, and I have had to
examine my conscience and accept any responsibility I have for
events that led to it.
94
Power's trajectory seemed to mirror in extreme proportions the
experiences of individuals, families, and the nation itself during an era
of dramatic social change.
95
The Power trial court was, appropriately, more concerned with
the illegality and violent results of Power's actions than with their
cultural resonance, and the sentencing judge's comments reflected the
anger expressed by Officer Schroeder's family.96 Yet the scope of the
burden imposed on Power effectively rendered virtually her entire life
experience contraband; any income related to her memory, "thoughts,
feelings, opinions, or emotions" became subject to criminal forfeiture,
as if the thoughts and feelings were coterminous with her crime. 97
Even if punishing wrongdoing and preventing criminals from
profiting were the primary goals of the trial court, both the trial and
Supreme Judicial courts should have recognized that the probation
condition also placed a significant burden on expression related to a
94. Statement of Vietnam War-Era Fugitive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at B9.
95. See, e.g., Kantrowitz et al., supra note 93, at 60:
After all these years, it's hard to know whom to feel the most sympathy for: the
children who lost a father, the family who lost a daughter, the young woman who
lost her way in the tumult of the '60s. And there are others suffering now: a
husband with a wife in jail, a son separated from his mother. Even with the best of
intentions, some things can never be made right.
96. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Sara Rimer, In Slain Officer's
Family, Anger and Forgiveness, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1993, at A22; Family's Grief in a
Daughter's Words, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1993 (courtroom statement at sentencing) ("For
reasons that I will never comprehend, the press and the public seem far more interested in
the difficulties that Katherine Power has inflicted upon herself than in the very real and
horrible suffering she inflicted upon my family."). But note that in the famous Nazi-Skokie
case the Seventh Circuit expressly held that the infliction of emotional distress on listeners
did not justify burdening the First Amendment rights of the speakers. Collin v. Smith, 578
F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978).
97. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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story of tremendous political and social significance. And the burden
on expression is not borne by Katherine Power alone. Although courts
have consistently devalued popular speech by and about criminals98
such speech is not of lesser value constitutionally. 99 The fact that
convicted criminals forfeit many rights100 does not justify speech
restraints that affect not only their ostensible target, the defendant,
but media and social discourse generally as well.
In National Treasury, the Supreme Court noted that a burden on
the speech of government employees would burden "the public's right
to hear what the employees would otherwise have written and
said," 10 1 and that while there is "no way to measure the true cost of
that burden .. , it might deprive us of the work of a future Melville or
Hawthorne. ' 10 2 The Court's example illustrates the larger social
danger of the chilling effect; but it also illustrates the irrelevant
calculation of "worthiness" that usually precedes recognition of a
chilling effect. It is inherently bad to deter a speaker;10 3 it is bad to
deprive the public of that speaker's ideas. Yet somehow, when faced
with an actual speaker whose ideas (or acts) are before the court,
rather than a potential speaker about whom the court can only
speculate-that is, when faced with Katherine Ann Power rather than
the specter of Herman Melville-courts routinely find that the value
of the speech is outweighed by the supposed value of the judicially
imposed burden.
Each criminal speaker who appeals a speech restriction does so
because she considers it to be an unconstitutional burden or prior
restraint. In all of the cases described here, widespread public interest
in the acts, and perhaps the expression, of the defendants has already
been demonstrated. For a court to decide that a speaker in this
position is less deserving of First Amendment protection than a
hypothetical, unnamed class member who is subject to a speech-
98. See supra Part II.
99. See supra note 34.
100. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding
disenfranchisement of convicted criminals, even when they have completed their sentences
and periods of parole); Power, 650 N.E.2d at 91 n.6 (surveying burdens imposed on
probationers by a variety of courts).
101. National Treasury, 513 U.S. at 470.
102. Id.
103. See DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 197: "[A]lmost everyone who believes in
rights at all would admit... that a man has a moral right to speak his mind in a
non-provocative way on matters of political concern, and that this is an important
right that the State must go to great pains to protect."
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burdening statute suggests that the court is assigning a value to the
content of the known speech, thus creating a subset of disfavored
speech which is not otherwise recognized in First Amendment
jurisprudence. This suggestion is strongly reinforced by the words of
the judges themselves. 1°4 These are improper determinations for
courts to make. Even legislatures may not legitimately distinguish
speech as more or less "worthy," outside the limited categories of
obscenity, incitement of lawless behavior, or fraud.
10 5
Despite the anti-media rhetoric of most courts addressing crime-
related expression, each would insist that it has not valued the speech
and found it wanting, but has looked for a chilling effect and found
none.106 In United States. v. Terrigno,10 7 the Ninth Circuit stated that a
probation condition barring receipt of money or anything of value
from appearances, writing, "or any other media coverage" 10 8 had not
forbidden her from speaking, only from profiting:
[W]e see no danger that the public will be denied the benefits of full
exposure of the facts of her crime and conviction nor that Terrigno
will be denied her first amendment rights of expression because the
trial court's condition only forbids Terrigno's making a profit, it does
not restrict expression at all. 10 9
The Power court, too, stated that the special condition allowed
Power to speak on any subject and "merely" prohibited her from
profiting from speech about her crime (which was construed to
include the twenty-three years subsequent to the criminal acts). 110
The defendants in these cases, though, have felt a chill, and the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that a content-based financial
104. See supra note 101. See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH 168-70 (1993) (even if content-based restrictions may be proper at times,
such restrictions often flow from unrevealed and improper government motives).
105. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (holding that the State may not
ban expletives ("fuck the draft") to "maintain what [officials] regard as a suitable level of
discourse within the body politic."); Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)
(noting that government "may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in
public facilities."); but see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)
(noting that non-obscene sexually explicit material less protected than political speech:
"few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to
see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice.").
106. A notable exception is United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1285 (3d Cir. 1994), in
which the court noted that defendant's sale of her story was "clearly what the district court
sought to prevent." See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
107. 838 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988).
108. Id. at 373.
109. Id. at 374.
110. Power, 650 N.E.2d at 90.
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disincentive to speech "raises the specter that the government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."
11 1
The chill may take the form of a direct disincentive, or may arise from
a combination of factors, such as the clarity of the court's disapproval
(and a consequent desire not to anger the court) or the vagueness of
the prohibition. 112 It is impossible to know whether or not the media
have been affected in these cases. Katherine Ann Power's story
disappeared from the news shortly after her sentencing and no
television movie about her life ever appeared. That may prove nothing
more than the fickleness of the news and entertainment industries
(and their audiences), but it must be noted that the doctrines of the
right of privacy and the right of publicity have created a strong
disincentive to non-news media actors representing a defendant's
story without her consent or cooperation. 113 Therefore, burdening the
speech rights of an individual will, at the least, affect the




Conclusion: Much Ado About Nothing?
In a society that allows not only the jailing and
disenfranchisement of criminals but their execution as well, limitations
on their speech rights may seem almost trivial. Deprivation of one
right is never a justification for deprivation of another, though, and
freedom of expression is arguably the most important right of all. But
111. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116.
112. See supra Part III; but see Steven B. Lichtman, The Right to a Soapbox: A Critique
of Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 55 U. PITT.
L. REV. 501, 517 (1994) (arguing that only a "lack of a truly voluntary choice" can
constitute an unconstitutional chilling effect).
113. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Stephen R. Barnett,
First Amendment Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 635 (1995); J.
Thomas McCarthy, Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 129 (1995).
114. Note that the Supreme Court did not decide whether it was the individual object
of the financial disincentive or the media who was the "speaker" in Simon & Schuster, but
remarked that the disincentive affected both:
Whether the First Amendment "speaker" is considered to be [author] Henry Hill,
whose income the statute places in escrow because of the story he has told, or
[publisher] Simon & Schuster, which can publish books about crime with the
assistance of only those criminals willing to forgo remuneration for at least five
years, the statute plainly imposes a financial disincentive....
502 U.S. at 116.
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does it truly matter if, as a result of a probation condition, the "media
circus" is reduced to a mere media garden party, or a convicted
criminal is discouraged from speaking? Or is a popular movie-of-the-
week or paid interview with a criminal "of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality"? 115 Judges
and legislators seem to think so when they express concern over "idle
gossip," "rumor-mongering," "obsessive" public interest in "bizarre
criminal acts," and "the glare of national news media attention."
However, gossip and rumor are forms of knowledge. They are among
the ways in which communities circulate and interpret social
information. Whatever the level of insight or the intellectual depth of
tabloid television and newspapers, they are far more popular than
C-SPAN or the New York Times, presumably because they convey
more of what people want to know in forms accessible and meaningful
to them.116 Judges who decide that an imposition on such media is no
imposition have overreached.
In the cases discussed above, the courts have invoked the favorite
arguments of those who would limit a basic right: The right is not
really limited in this case; or, the right is limited but marginally so, and
only in response to an abuse; or, the limit placed on the right here is
necessary to avoid a greater harm to society.
117
The first of these arguments, that the right is not really limited, is
disingenuous. Some of the courts have admitted their intention to
prevent the sale of story rights or "glamorization" of crime; all have
singled out expressive activity in the context of public and media
attention. While unable to bar speech directly, these courts have
crafted acknowledged disincentives to speech which, because
individually applied, are meant to survive challenges that would defeat
statutes with the same effects.
The third argument, that the right is limited in order to prevent a
115. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
116. This observation is not meant to suggest that public tastes and desires are not
shaped and, perhaps, created, in part, by popular media-i.e., not to say that commerce is
truly driven by consumers. There is obviously a complex interplay between providers and
consumers that shapes the end product. Nor is it meant to suggest that the New York
Times, and even C-SPAN, are not responsive to their audiences. But judicial valuation of
media content is inappropriate whether that content is "high" or "low," and whether the
content is shaped by consumer demand or producer "creation" of demand.
117. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 200 (describing grounds "consistently ... used to
limit the definition of a particular right.").
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greater harm to society, is not serious in this context. It is highly
questionable to argue that income from speech about crime is
forfeitable criminal profit,118 and more questionable still to say that a
judge may decide that profitable (or "beneficial") cooperation with
the media by the criminal is a new wrong which would cause
measurable harm to a society apparently eager to hear his story. The
third argument is best reserved for assessing such problems as the
rights of speakers to enter homes uninvited, or of individuals to set off
explosives on their property.
Only the second of the arguments, that the right is only
marginally limited in response to a wrong, merits consideration. Like
the third argument, though, it requires that one accept the notion that
rights are measurable in degree and may be meaningfully weighed
against other rights or social values-an approach that seriously
undervalues the significance of rights to individuals and to society.
119
The calculations of this sort that courts have made so far to address
crime-related expression have significantly overreached and
unnecessarily degraded the expressive rights of citizens.
If the public and the courts believe that compensation for
expression is profit from crime, then broad fines already sanctioned
under the sentencing guidelines and well-established tort-law
principles offer sufficient remedy.120 Criminals may be fined and
jailed. Victims may sue for civil damages. But to single out speech as a
118. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
119. See DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 204 (government must "not define citizens' rights
so that these are cut off for supposed reasons of the general good."). To critique ad hoc
regulation of speech and the balancing of speech against other rights and values is not
necessarily to argue for the supremacy of individual speech rights, or individualism
generally. Most reasoned justifications of speech rights are based on some notion of public
interest. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 179 (1986):
In the Common Law freedom of expression is regularly defended, where it is
defended, on grounds of the public interest, that is on the interests of third
parties. The right holder's interest itself conceived independently of its
contribution to public interest, is deemed insufficient to justify holding others to
be subject to the extensive duties and disabilities commonly derived from the
rights of free speech.
See also RODNEY SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE
ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT §§ 2.01-2.05 (1994) (reviewing classic theories of free speech
including marketplace, human dignity and self-fulfillment, and theories of democratic self-
governance).
120. See Timmons, supra note 11, at 1169 ("Traditional tort law maintains a balance
between society's need to prevent incentives for committing crime while allowing for
adequate victim compensation.... Moreover, tort law does not interfere with the criminal
author's right to free speech.").
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means of righting a wrong is wrong. If the public does not want crime-
related expression reported or dramatized, it will abandon media that
do so. If the public abhors the phenomenon of "checkbook
journalism," it will shun outlets that pay their news sources. The First
Amendment is hollow, though, if judges may consider the content of,
and venue for, speech in order to decide which speakers and which
topics merit its full protection.
,if
I
